Abstract. We consider repeated games where at any period each player knows only his set of actions and the stream of payoffs that he has received in the past. He knows neither his own payoff function, nor the characteristics of the other players (how many there are, their strategies and payoffs). In this context, we present an adaptive procedure for play -called "modified-regret-matching" -which is interpretable as a stimulus-response or reinforcement procedure, and which has the property that any limit point of the empirical distribution of play is a correlated equilibrium of the stage game.
Introduction
Werner Hildenbrand has repeatedly emphasized the usefulness, conceptual and technical, of carrying out equilibrium analysis by means of distributional notions. For social situations modelled as N -person games, the concept of correlated equilibrium, an extension of Nash equilibrium introduced by Aumann, can be viewed in a most natural way as imposing equilibrium conditions on the distribution of action combinations of the different players. Correlated equilibrium will be the subject of the current paper, and the style of our analysis should not surprise anybody familiar with Hildenbrand's research. This paper continues the study of Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] , where the notion of correlated equilibrium and that of approachability by means of simple "rules of thumb" or "adaptive procedures" of play were linked. We showed there that if a game is repeatedly played and the players determine their stage probabilities of play according to a procedure called "regret-matching," then the empirical distribution of play converges with probability one to the set Dedicated with great admiration to Werner Hildenbrand on his 65th birthday. Previous versions of these results were included in the Center for Rationality Discussion Papers #126 (December 1996) and #166 (March 1998). We thank Dean Foster for suggesting the use of "modified regrets." The research is partially supported by grants of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities; the Spanish Ministry of Education; the Generalitat de Catalunya; CREI; and the EU-TMR Research Network.
of correlated equilibria of the given game. Regret-matching means that if at period t player i has taken action j, then the probability of playing another action k at time t+1 will be proportional to the "regret for not having played k instead of j," which is defined simply as the increase, if any, in the average payoff that would result if all past plays of action j were replaced by action k (and everything else remained unaltered).
The implementation of regret-matching by a player requires that player to observe the actions taken by all players in the past. But that is not all. The player should also be able to carry out the thought experiment of computing what his payoffs would have been, had his actions in the past been different from what they really were. For this he needs to know what game he is playing (or, at the very least, his own payoff function).
In this paper we will show that this level of sophistication and knowledge is not really necessary to obtain correlated equilibria. We shall modify the regret-matching procedure in such a way that the play probabilities are determined from the actual realizations only. Specifically, each player only needs to know the payoffs he received in past periods. He need not know the game he is playing -neither his own payoff function nor the others players' payoffs; in fact, he may well be oblivious of the fact that there is a game at all. The procedure that we shall examine is a "stimulus-response" or "reinforcement" procedure, in the sense that a relatively high payoff at period t will tend to increase the probability of playing at period t + 1 the same action that was played at t.
In Section 2 we present the basic model and state our results. Section 3 contains some further discussions, and the proofs are given in Section 4.
To summarize: We consider repeated games where each player knows only his set of available choices (but nothing about the other players), and observes only his own actually realized payoffs. We exhibit simple strategies of play whereby the long-run frequencies of the various action combinations being played are tantamount to a correlated equilibrium. Of course, this sophisticated "macro"-picture that emerges cannot be seen at the individual level. This is a conclusion, we trust, with which Werner Hildenbrand can truly sympathize.
Model and results
We consider finite N -person games in strategic (or "normal") form. The set of players is a finite set N, the action 1 set of each player i ∈ N is a finite set S i , and the payoff function of i is u i : S → R, where 2 S := ∈N S . We will denote this game N,
A correlated equilibrium -a concept introduced by Aumann [1974] is nothing other than a Nash equilibrium where each player may receive a private signal before the game is played (the signals do not affect the payoffs; and the players may base their choices on the signals received). This may be equivalently described as follows: Assume that the signal of each player i is in fact a "play recommendation" s i ∈ S i , where the N -tuple s = s i i∈N is selected (by a "device" or "mediator") according to a commonly known probability distribution. A correlated equilibrium results if each player realizes that the best he can do is to follow the recommendation, provided that all the other players do likewise. Equivalently, a probability distribution ψ on the set S of action N -tuples (i.e., ψ (s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ S and s∈S ψ (s) = 1) is a correlated equilibrium of the game Γ if, for every player i ∈ N and every two actions j, k ∈ S i of i, we have
where
The inequality (1) (after dividing the expression there by s∈S:s i =j ψ (s)) means that when the recommendation to player i is to choose action j, then choosing k instead of j cannot yield a higher expected payoff to i. Finally, a correlated ε-equilibrium obtains when 0 is replaced by ε on the right-hand side of (1 These are simple adaptive strategies where the play probabilities are proportional to the "regrets" for not having played other actions. Specifically, for any two distinct actions j = k in S i and every time t, the regret of i at t from j to k is
This is the change in the average payoff of i that would have resulted if he had played action k every time in the past that he actually chose j. Rewriting this as
shows that player i can compute the second term: it is just (1/t) τ ≤t:
τ . But i cannot compute the first term, since he knows neither his own payoff function u i nor the choices s
−i
τ of the other players. Therefore we replace the first term by an "estimate" that can be computed on the basis of the available information; namely, we define
where p i τ denotes the play probabilities at time t (thus p i τ (j) is the probability that i chose j at period τ ); these probabilities p i τ are defined below (they will indeed depend only on U i 1 , ..., U i t ). As in (2), the modified regrets are then
In words, the modified regret for not having used k instead of j measures the difference (strictly speaking, its positive part) of the average payoff over the periods when k was used and the periods when j was used. In addition, the payoffs of these periods are normalized in a manner that, intuitively speaking, makes the length of the respective periods comparable.
4
Next we define the play probabilities, based on these modified regrets. Recall the regret-matching procedure of [HM]: If j := s i t is the action chosen by i at time t, then the probability of switching at time t + 1 to another action k = j is proportional (with a fixed factor 1/µ) to the regret from j to k; with the remaining probability, the same action j is chosen again. Here we shall make two changes relative to [HM] . First, we need to guarantee that the sum of the proposed probabilities does not exceed one; multiplying the modified regrets by a factor 1/µ (which we still do) does not suffice because the modified regrets are not bounded.
5 Second, we need every action to be played with some minimal frequency. 6 Thus we shall require that the transitions "tremble" over every action.
Let therefore µ > 0 be a sufficiently large number; as in [HM] , it suffices to take µ so that µ > 2M i m i − 1 for all i, where m i := S i is 7 the number of actions of i, and M i is an upper bound on u i (s) for all s ∈ S. Let 0 < δ < 1, and define the play probabilities of player i at time t + 1 by
where j := s i t is the choice of i in (the previous) period t. As for the first period, the play probabilities at t = 1 are given by an arbitrary strictly positive vector p
is a weighted average of two probability vectors (note that p
The first, with weight 1 − δ, is given by the modified regrets in a manner similar to [HM, Formula (2.2)] (note that taking the minimum with 1/ m i − 1 guarantees that the resulting sum does not exceed 1). The second term, with weight δ, is just the uniform distribution over S i : each k ∈ S i has equal probability 1/m i . This "uniform tremble" guarantees that all probabilities at time t + 1 are at least δ/m i > 0. Putting (4), (5) and (6) 
is the relative frequency that the N -tuple of actions s has been played in the first t stages.
5 Notice that there is no a priori lower bound on the probabilities appearing in the denominators. 6 Roughly speaking, one needs this exogenous statistical "noise" to be able to estimate the contingent payoffs using only the realized payoffs (recall the first term in the modified regret). In fact, this is quite delicate, since the actions of the other players are never observed. 7 We write |A| for the number of elements of a finite set A. 8 We write ∆ (A) := p ∈ R A + : a∈A p(a) = 1 for the set of probability distributions over the finite set A.
Our first result is: Theorem 1. For every ε > 0 there is a δ 0 ≡ δ 0 (ε) > 0 such that for all δ < δ 0 , if every player i plays according to adaptive procedure (6) , then the empirical distributions of play z t converge almost surely as t → ∞ to the set of correlated ε-equilibria of the game Γ .
Thus: for almost every trajectory, z t is close to a correlated ε-equilibrium for all large enough t; equivalently, z t is a correlated 2ε-equilibrium from some time on (this time may depend on the trajectory; the theorem states that, with probability one, it is finite). As in the Main Theorem of [HM] , note that the convergence is not to a point, but to a set; that is, the distance to the set goes to 0. Finally, we remark that both µ and δ can be taken to be different for different players.
To obtain in the limit correlated equilibria -rather than correlated approximate equilibria -we need δ to decrease to 0 as t increases. A simple way to do this is to replace δ in (6) by δ/t γ , where γ is a number strictly between 0 and 9 1/4. Thus, we now define
where, again, j := s We have chosen the particular type of sequence δ t := δ/t γ for simplicity and convenience only. What matters is, first, that δ t converge to 0, and second, that it do so sufficiently slowly (otherwise the modified regrets C i t may become too large; recall that the probabilities p i t , which are bounded from below by δ t−1 /m i , appear in the denominators). This explains the need for an upper bound on γ (it turns out that γ < 1/4 suffices; see the proof in Section 4). Moreover, we note that one may well take different sequences δ i t for different players i (cf. the Remark at the end of Section 4). 9 The reason for this restriction will be explained below.
Discussion

(a) Reinforcement and stimulus-response
The play procedures of this paper can be interpreted as "reinforcement" or "stimulus-response" procedures (see, 8]) . Indeed, the behavior of our players is very far from the ideal of a sophisticated decision-maker that makes optimal decisions given his (more or less well-formed) beliefs about the environment. The behavior we postulate is, in fact, much closer to the model of a reflexoriented individual that, from a very limited conception of the world in which he lives, simply reacts to stimuli by reinforcing those behaviors with "pleasurable" consequences.
In order to be specific and to illustrate the above point further, let us assume that the payoffs are positive and focus on the limit case of our procedure where probabilities are chosen in exact proportion to the modified regrets (5) . Suppose that player i has played action j at period t. We then have for every k = j:
Thus all the modified regrets decrease (or stay null) from t to t+1. Hence the probability of choosing j at t + 1 gets "reinforced" (i.e., increases relative to the same probability at t) by the occurrence of j at t, while the probabilities of the other actions k = j decrease. Moreover, as can easily be seen from Definitions (4) and (5), the higher the payoff obtained at time t (when j was played), the greater this reinforcement. Finally, all these effects decrease with time -since we average over t in (4).
(b) Related work
There is by now a substantive body of work on not fully optimal behavior in repeated games (see for instance the book of Fudenberg and Levine [1998] ). In particular, strategies that lead to the set of correlated equilibria have been proposed by Foster and Vohra [1997] and by Fudenberg and Levine [1999] . There is also an older tradition, beginning with Hannan [1957] , that focuses on another form of regrets (of an "unconditional" kind -see (c) below) and on strategies that asymptotically take them down to zero. Clearly, our work (here and in Hart and Mas-Colell [2000, 2001] ) belongs to these lines of research. Since the main difference between [HM] and the current paper is that here the players do not know the game, we want to point out that this "unknown game case" has already been studied. Specifically, in the context of Hannan regrets, see Foster and Vohra [1993, 1998 ], Auer et al. [1995] and Fudenberg and Levine [1998, Section 4.8] (and also Baños [1968] and Megiddo [1980] for related work).
(c) Hannan-consistency
We say that a strategy of a player is Hannan-consistent if it guarantees that his long-run average payoff is as large as the highest payoff that can be obtained by playing a constant action; that is, it is no less than the oneshot best-reply payoff against the empirical distribution of play of the other players. Formally, the Hannan regret of player i at time t for action k ∈ S i is defined as
where z In the setup of the current paper, the "modified-regret-matching" approach leads to a simple reinforcement strategy that is Hannan- 
Here δ t = δ/t γ for some δ > 0 and 0 < γ < 1/2; we take p t+1 ∈ ∆(S i ) to be arbitrary for t = 0 and whenever the denominator vanishes. We have
Theorem 3. The strategy (8) is Hannan-consistent.
The proof of this theorem is parallel to, and simpler than, the proof of Theorem 2 below, and therefore omitted. 10 I.e., z k) ; we can thus refer to DH i t (k) as the "unconditional regret for k," and to D i t (j, k) as the "regret for k, conditional on j."
Proof
In this section we will prove Theorems 1 and 2 of Section 2 together. Let δ t := δ t γ where δ > 0 and 0 ≤ γ < 1/4. For Theorem 1 take γ = 0, and for Theorem 2, γ > 0.
We introduce some notations, in addition to those of the previous sections. Fix player i in N ; for simplicity, we drop reference to the index i whenever this does not create confusion (thus we write C t instead of C i t , and so on). Recall that m := S i is the number of strategies of i, and M is an upper bound on the payoffs:
Thus, we have
We shall write B t for the vector (B t (j, k)) (j,k)∈L ∈ R L ; and similarly for the other vectors A t , C t , and so on. Next, define
Note that Π t (j, ·) ∈ ∆ S
i for all j ∈ S i ; thus Π t is a transition probability matrix on S i . Both procedures (6) and (7) satisfy p i t+1 (k) = Π t s i t , k for all k (where, again, γ = 0 corresponds to (6) and γ > 0 to (7)). Let
We write 1E for the indicator of the event E (i.e., 1E = 1 if E occurs and = 0 otherwise).
be the squared Euclidean distance (in R L ) of the vector C t from the nonpositive orthant R L . We will use the standard "O" notation: For two real-valued functions f (·) and g (·) defined on a domain X, we take "f (x) = O (g (x)) " to mean that there exists a constant K < ∞ such that |f (x)| ≤ Kg (x) for all x in X. From now on, t, v, w will denote positive integers; h t = (s τ ) τ ≤t will be histories of length t; j, k, and s i will be strategies of i (i.e., elements of S i ); s and s −i will be elements of S and S −i , respectively. Unless stated otherwise, all statements should be understood to hold "for all t, v, h t , j, k, etc."; where histories h t are concerned, only those that occur with positive probability are considered. Finally, P stands for Probability, E for Expectation and Var for Variance.
The proof of Theorems 1 and 2 will be divided into 14 steps.
Step 14 shows that the regrets are "small" in the limit; the Proposition of Section 3 of [HM] then implies that the empirical distributions are correlated approximate equilibria. We note that Steps 1-11 hold for any non-increasing sequence δ t > 0, whereas Steps 12-14 make use of the special form δ t = δ/t γ . A guide to the proof follows the statement of the steps.
• Step 1:
• Step 2:
• Step 3:
13 Note that β t+w (j) is measurable with respect to ht+w (actually, it depends only on ht+w−1 and s
Z τ (j, k) ; and
• Step 4:
• Step 5:
For each t > 0 and each history h t , we define an auxiliary stochastic process (ŝ t+w ) w=0,1,2,... with values in S as follows: The initial state isŝ t = s t , and the transition probabilities are
That is, theŝ-process is stationary: It uses the transition probabilities of period t at each period t + 1, t + 2, ..., t + w, ....
• Step 6:
• Step 7:
14 (Πt) 2 is the second power of the matrix Πt (i.e., ΠtΠt), and (Πt)
is the (k, j)-element of the matrix (Πt) 2 − Πt. 15 We write Π t for the transition probability matrix of player (thus Πt is Π i t ).
• Step 8:
Step 9:
• Step 10:
• Step 11:
such a ξ exists since 0 ≤ γ < 1/4. For each n = 1, 2, ..., let t n := n ξ be the largest integer not exceeding n ξ .
• Step 12: There exists η < 2ξ − 1 such that
• Step 13:
(ii) If γ > 0 then lim n→∞ ρ tn = 0 a.s. 16 When γ = 0, (9) is 1 < ξ < 2.
• Step 14:
( Step M7]). Finally, we obtain the recursion formula in Step 9. On comparing this formula with the parallel one in [HM,
Step M8], we see that in Step 9 there are additional terms; one of them, which comes about because the modified regrets are not bounded, contains a random variable Y t .
Step 10, Step 11 and the Proof of Step 13 show that this term also goes to zero. Steps 12 and 13 complete the proof for the modified regrets, in a manner that is similar to [HM, Steps M9-M11] (though more complicated, partly because of the Y t terms). As we have indicated above, Step 14 yields the needed result for the actual regrets.
We now proceed to the proofs of Steps 1-14.
• Proof of Step 1:
Indeed: For the second term, note that C
As for the third term, we have u i (s) ≤ M and |Z t+w (j, k)| ≤ m/δ t+w ≤ m/δ t+v for w ≤ v (since the sequence δ t is non-increasing); therefore B t+w (j, k) and C t (j, k) are each bounded by 2M m/δ t+v . This yields (ii). To get (i), take the conditional expectation given h t (thus ρ t and C t are fixed).
• Proof of Step 2: Note that B t+w (j, k) vanishes except when s i t+w = j, k. We condition on h t+w−1 and s −i t+w (i.e., on the whole history h t+w except player i's choice at time t + w):
(we have collected together all terms containing u i j, s −i ). Conditioning now on h t yields the result.
• Proof of Step 3: We have
For j = k, it is at most m − 1 times this amount.
• Proof of Step 4: We distinguish two cases. First, when (1/µ) C
and this is O (δ t ) (it lies between 0 and δ t /m).
For the opposite inequality, note that |Z τ (j, k)| ≤ 2+Z τ (j, k) (since the only possible negative value of Z τ (j, k) is −1), thus
• Proof of Step 5: Denote s i t+w−1 by r; then
Also,
(we have subtracted the j-term from both sums). Comparing the last expression with β t+w (j), we see that (Π t ) 2 − Π t (r, j) is obtained by replacing each C + t /µ and each Π t+w−1 in β t+w (j) by Π t . Thus
by the estimates of Steps 3(ii) and 4. It only remains to substitute this into the formula of Step 2.
• Proof of Step 6: We use the Lemma of [HM,
Step M4], which implies that if the 1-step transition probabilities of two Markov processes on S differ by at most β, then the w-step transition probabilities differ by at most |S| wβ. Applying this to theŝ-and s-processes, with β given by Step 3(ii), yields the result.
• Proof of Step 7: Replacing (s t+w ) w by (ŝ t+w ) w in the formula of
Step 5 gives an additional error that is estimated in Step 6 (note that the two processes (s t+w ) w and (ŝ t+w ) w start from the same history h t ).
• Proof of Step 8: Given h t , the random variablesŝ are independent, since the transition probabilities of theŝ-process are all determined at time t, and the players randomize independently. Hence: Recalling the formula of Step 1(i) completes the proof. (but we then need γ < 1/5 rather than γ < 1/4).
The proof is completed by applying again the Strong Law of Large Numbers for Dependent Random Variables (Theorem 4) and noting that 0 ≤ ρ tn = (1/b n ) ν≤n X ν .
